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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Holt has failed to demonstrate an absence of genuine 
factual disputes. The judge may not granted summary judgment as 
a result of having weighed the evidence. 
Since Holt's ex-husband no longer owned the property/ 
neither law nor the contract required his written approval. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Holt has conceded several of Krantz's points. These 
include the following facts, admitted either expressly or by 
failure to respond: 
a. The $500 check was not deposited, and was not 
presented at the branch where Krantz banks. 
b. The parties agreed to include the $500 in the payment 
at closing. 
c. Holt's ex-husband no longer had any interest in the 
home. 
d. Holt's ex-husband approved the sale orally. 
e. The parties agreed to a closing date one day later 
than the date contemplated by the earnest money agreement. 
f. Krantz deposited the purchase price the morning of 
the agreed closing date. 
2. Several legal arguments are also not opposed, and may 
be deemed conceded. They include (with citations to the page in 
Krantz's brief where they are discussed): 
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g. That the benefit of all factual doubts must be 
resolved in favor of Krantz, since the dismissal was on a 
summary judgment motion. App. Br. p. 14. 
h. That the trial court relied upon inadmissible 
hearsay to find the check was "dishonored." App. Br. p. 16. 
Holt has not even attempted to point to a hearsay exception. 
See Resp. Br. 
i. The (disputed) problem with the $500 check does not 
constitute a "substantial" failure of performance. App. Br. p. 
19, quoting Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 
(Utah 1975). 
j. The primary consideration was the purchase price, not 
the $500 earnest money. App. Br. p. 20. 
k. Holt's ex-husband could not have enforced any 
agreement to sell the property, since his interest had long 
since been awarded to Holt in a divorce. App. Br. p. 26. 
1. Krantz performed his obligations under the contract. 
App. Br. pp. 27-28. 
m. The Statute of Frauds does not apply in the event of 
part performance. 
3. There remain factual disputes. This is made 
especially clear by the fact that much of the briefing has been 
consumed by arguing whether or not the $500 check was 
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dishonored. Further, the parties hotly dispute whether Holt's 
former husband held any conveyable interest at the time of 
execution of the earnest money contract, necessitating his 
signature absent part performance. 
4. Holt cannot overcome her hearsay problem. The 
judge's ruling is expressly based in large measure upon a 
finding that the check was dishonored. That finding stems from 
Holt's representation that someone from the bank told her 
Krantz's check would not clear on certain dates. 
If she had actually deposited the check, she might have 
gained personal knowledge of whether it was dishonored. As it 
stands, she must point only to blatant hearsay, offered to prove 
her version of the truth of the matter: that there was not 
enough money in the Krantz account. Utah Rules of Ev. 801(c). 
A primary reason hearsay is not admissible is that the 
declarant is not available for cross examination. State v. 
Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957), interpreting Utah 
Rules of Ev. 802. Here the bank employee is not available, nor 
even identified. 
Good sense indicates that it is especially inappropriate 
to resolve with hearsay the key issue in a summary judgment 
decision, rendered without a full fleshing out of the facts. It 
must be borne in mind that the issue around which the hearsay 
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revolves (whether the check was dishonored) is an issue of 
controversy/ both factually and legally. This was pointed out 
in Krantz's opening brief (Br. pp. 14-15), and was not really 
disputed by Holt. 
5. Consideration was the purchase and sale of the home. 
Here again, Krantz's opening brief pointed out that the 
consideration for the contract was the entire purchase price of 
the home. Br. p. 20. Rather than meeting that assertion head 
on, Holt simply states, as she did to the trial court, "The 
consideration required to support the earnest money agreement in 
this case is written in the contract: the payment of Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) by Krantz to Holt." Response Br. p. 
6-7. This approach ignores the subject transaction and meaning 
of the parties1 contract. 
Holt is correct in stating that the consideration is 
"written in the contract." But it is far from clear why she 
feels free to excise and only consider the $500. The only 
portions of the contract to which she could be referring to read 
as follows: 
The undersigned Buyer Randy Krantz hereby 
deposits with Brokerage EARNEST MONEY in the amount 
of Five Hundred & no/100 Dollars ($500.00) in the 
form of personal check which shall be deposited in 
accordance with applicable State Law. 
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2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING, The total 
purchase price for the property is Twenty Seven 
Thousand & no/100 dollars ($27,000,00) which shall 
be paid as follows: 
$500 which represents the aforedescribed 
EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
$26500,00 representing the approximate balance of 
CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
t$27,000,00 I TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 8-1-86, p. 2, Appendix E to 
Krantz Brief, Exhibit A to Response Brief (emphasis in original; 
underlining indicative of hand written fill in the blank 
entries). 
Holt may not unilaterally declare the smallest portion of 
the purchase price, the $500 earnest money "deposit", to be 
"the" consideration. She especially may not assert (as she must 
on summary judgment) that it is undisputed that the lower amount 
is the sole consideration. 
6. Holt confuses "failure of consideration" with "lack 
of consideration." The order which she asks this Court uphold 
gives as one of its grounds for dismissal "failure of 
consideration tendered in the form of a personal check, which 
was dishonored. . . . " Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 196-97, Appendix C to Opening Br., p. 2. 
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Since failure of consideration was a stated basis for the 
trial court's dismissal (and failure of consideration was not), 
Krantz argued that there was no such failure. Opening Br. p. 
18-19. In response, Holt ignored that argument and dwelt 
instead upon "lack" of consideration. Yet Holt's same Response 
Brief still states that the first issue is whether the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment "based on failure of 
consideration. . . ." Br. p. 1 (unnumbered)(emphasis added). 
This midstream switch should not be tolerated/ and only 
serves to confuse the issues. Krantz cited as error the trial 
court's holding, not what Holt believes the judge could have 
held. For Holt to establish (and the trial court to find) lack 
of consideration, this Court would have to remand the matter for 
trial. See, Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 632, n. 
4 (Utah App. 1988) (there is a presumption that written contract 
is supported by consideration, and "when evidence tending to 
prove lack of consideration is introduced, the issue . 
becomes a question of fact for the trier of fact"}. Krantz 
requests such a remand. 
7. "Failure" and "lack" of consideration are not the 
same thing. 
There is a distinction between lack of 
consideration and failure of consideration. Where 
consideration is lacking, there can be no contract. 
Where consideration fails, there was a contract 
when the agreement was made, but because of some 
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supervening cause, the promised performance fails. 
General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 
502, 504-505 (Utah 1976); cited with approval, Dementas, supra, 
764 P.2d at 632, n. 4. It is too late now for Holt to elect a 
new theory to support a previously granted summary judgment 
motion. 
8. There is sufficient consideration. [This issue, 
introduced by Holt for the first time on appeal, is treated in 
the event the Court considers her argument.] There is 
consideration "whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where a 
promisee suffers a detriment, however slight." Dementas, supra, 
764 P.2d at 632, quoting Gasser v. Home, 557 P.2d 154, 155 
(Utah 1976). 
Under the above standard, surely even a promise to pay 
$500, either currently or at closing, would be sufficient 
consideration. Without question the $27,000 purchase price, the 
real consideration, is adequate. 
9. The check was not properly presented. On this issue 
Holt virtually admits that there remain factual issues, when she 
states: 
Krantz claims that the check was never formally 
presented to the bank. He also claims that between 
the date the check was issued, August 1, 1986, and 
the date he closed the contract, August 21, 1986, 
there were only a few days that his account did not 
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contain sufficient funds to cover the check. 
(Krantz depo. p. 42-44). Krantz further claims 
that if Holt had presented the check to his own 
branch or deposited it, the check would have 
cleared. (Krantz depo. p. 44, 1. 21). 
Response Br. p. 7. 
The statute sets forth the definition of "presentment". 
§ 70A-3-504(l)(1965) ("demand for acceptance or payment"). But 
Holt misinterprets the way presentment must occur. She 
correctly cites to subparagraph (2) of the above section, but 
then disregards its plain meaning. 
(2) Presentment may be made 
(a) at the place of acceptance or payment 
specified in the instrument or if there be none at 
the place ot business or residence of the party to 
accept or pay. 
§ 70A-3-504(2)(c) (1965) (emphasis added). Amazingly, Holt 
follows a quotation of that statute with, "Therefore it was 
Holt's option to cash the check at the Bountiful branch of 
Commercial Security Bank, which was in the city where she 
resided, and not at Krantzfs branch . . . ." Br. p. 8 (emphasis 
added). 
Of course the statute makes it clear that the place of 
residence of Krantz (the payor) or his bank branch is the proper 
place of presentment, not a Bountiful branch of that bank. The 
place "specified in the instrument" in this case is 
"FOURTH SOUTH OFFICE -
Commercial Security Bank 
519 E. 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Check # 4751# Exhibit B to Response Brief. Obviously, proper 
presentment was not made. To support what the trial court did, 
Holt, who neither deposited the check for acceptance nor 
presented it at the drawee branch for payment, must demonstrate 
that there is no factual dispute over whether there was proper 
consideration and whether the check was "dishonored". 
10. The parties' modification is valid. If Holt wishes 
to dispute that she asked Krantz to simply include the $500 with 
the payment to be made at closing, there remains an issue of 
fact for trial. She is mistaken when she states (without 
authority) that "if a written contract is modified, the 
modification must also be in writing." Br. p. 9. See, Calhoun 
v. Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d 284, 106 Utah 166 (1944) 
(parties usually may orally modify written contract). 
More importantly, Holt's request that the $500 be 
included in the purchase price at closing is a waiver of strict 
compliance with the existing contract, not a modification 
requiring consideration or a writing. Krantz offered to replace 
the check when Holt claimed to have had trouble cashing it. 
Krantz depo. p. 46, 1. 2 to 12; Holt depo. p. 22, 1. 2 to 12, 
quoted at pp. 17-18, Opening Br. Holt declined (Id.). She 
requested that Krantz just include it at closing, operating as a 
waiver of any other form or time of payment she might have 
otherwise been able to enforce. 
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Instead of arranging for the check to clear (or paying 
cash), Krantz waiting and deposited the money at closing. Where 
a party misleads the other into believing strict performance of 
the contract is unnecessary/ she may not suddenly reverse her 
position and demand strict performance in order to avoid going 
through with the agreed upon transaction. Caldwell v* Anschutz 
Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 964, 13 Utah 2d 177 (1962). 
At a minimum, it is clear from the above that there were 
not sufficient undisputed facts from which the court could have 
made any "finding" about whether the check was dishonored, 
whether Holt waived strict performance and whether the disputed 
check problem somehow excused closing the contract. 
11. The Statute of Frauds was not violated. This was 
demonstrated in Krantz's Opening Brief. pp. 21-28. That 
argument need not be repeated at length. But because Holt is 
reckless with her reference to her "husband", it must be 
emphasized that at all times relevant to this case they were 
divorced. Long before the earnest money agreement was signed, 
the divorce decree awarded that house in its entirety to Holt. 
As owner of the property, she had the right to contract 
for its conveyance. Mr. Holt could have conveyed nothing. If 
Mr. Holt's name appeared on the title, it was merely a title 
defect Mrs. Holt was required to clear up by closing, or risk 
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being in breach. See, Earnest Money Agreement, p. 3, H 3, 
Opening Br. Appendix E, Response Br. Exhibit A. 
Holt continually refers to her then ex-husband as "joint 
owner", without arguing why he so qualifies. She begs the 
question by arguing that a joint owner must sign a contract to 
convey his land. Response Br. pp 10-14. 
The statute of frauds only limits the ability to grant an 
interest in real property. § 25-5-1, Utah Code (1989). It has 
no application to a contract requiring oral approval for the 
true owner to convey her interest. 
Since he is not a co-owner, the contract and not the 
statute of frauds determines whether Mr. Holt's approval had to 
be written. It merely stated, "Offer subject to approval of 
Stephen Holt by 8-4-86". Earnest Money Agreement, p. 3, K 3, 
Opening Br. Appendix E, Response Br. Exhibit A, 11 7. 
12. Holt has not shown that her leading case applies. 
Appellant's Opening Brief demonstrates that Williams v. 
Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986), does not apply. Br. pp. 
24-26. Without disposing of those arguments, or even 
establishing what made Holt's former husband an owner for 
statute of frauds purposes, Holt simply undertakes to argue the 
case. Response Br. pp. 11-13. If Holt wishes to have her 
ex-husband treated as an owner, she must have adduced unaisputed 
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evidence to that effect in the trial court. Rather than do so, 
she conceded Krantz's evidence that Mr. Holt's rights were 
terminated by the divorce decree. 
The simple fact is that the Williams spouses were still 
married and still joint tenants. Here, the divorcees no longer 
jointly owned the land. Krantz incorporates by reference all 
his prior arguments on the inapplicability and 
distinguishability of Williams. Id. 
13. Timeliness of the ex-husband's approval is, at best, 
a factual issue. The contract provides that the approval should 
be by August 4, 1986. Holt testified that he did approve, 
"approximately one week after the earnest money." Holt depo. p. 
10. Amazingly, Holt turns this "approximately one week" into a 
supposedly undisputed fact: that the admitted approval by Holt's 
husband was not timely. 
Of coursed Holt ignores her own waiver of strict 
performance under the contract, and the fact that the time is of 
the essence clause only comes into effect 30 days after closing. 
Earnest Money Agreement, p. 3, % 3, Opening Br. Appendix E, 
Response Br. Exhibit A, 11 Q. 
14. Performance clearly takes the agreement outside the 
statute of frauds, if that statute ever applied. This was 
- 15 -
pointed out at length in Krantz's opening brief* Br. pp. 26-28. 
And six instances of part performance were set forth. Id. at p. 
27-28. Yet Holt's only response is to state that the part 
performance usually benefits the seller, and Holt was not 
benefited. She cites to no authority for that unique standard 
for part performance. 
Certainly the statute on part performance alludes to no 
such requirement. § 25-5-8, Utah Code (1907). Holt has 
suggested no reason to interpret the statute contrary to its 
plain language, which makes a straight-forward exclusion from 
the statute of frauds "in case of part performance . . • .n 
Id. 
The elements of part performance in instances like this 
are set forth in Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 56 (Utah 1980). 
Conferring some benefit on the other party is not mentioned as 
an element. The same is true in Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 
1035, 1038 (Utah 1975) (oral contract by joint tenant spouses 
upheld due to substantial part performance). 
15. Closing the sale the day after the contract's stated 
date does not excuse performance• There is no evidence that 
this closing date, requested by Holt herself and reconfirmed 
that very day, was a condition to enforcement of the contract. 
Even the trial judge held that the untimely closing argument was 
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not sufficient of itself to excuse performance. Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 196-97, Appendix C to Opening 
Br., p. 2. It was merely an afterthought and excuse for buyer's 
remorse. The evidence needed to prove otherwise has not been 
propounded. 
The "time is of the essence" clause was not effective 
under the circumstances where (a) 30 days after closing had not 
passed (only one day had), (b) Holt had chosen the date, waiving 
her right to complain about it, and (c) Krantz had relied upon 
her date selection in not closing sooner. Under those 
conditions Holt is estopped to take advantage of the technical 
variation from the contract which she herself arranged. See, 
Earnest Money Agreement, p. 3, 11 3, Opening Br. Appendix E, 
Response Br. Exhibit A, 11 Q (acts of God may extend closing by 
seven days, "but in no event more than thirty (30) dctys beyond 
the closing date provided herein. Thereafter, time is of the 
essence."} Id. (emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court improperly weighed the evidence, and made a 
factual finding that Krantz's check was dishonored. This 
finding is particularly erroneous, since it was based on rank 
hearsay. Had the check been properly presented, it would have 
cleared. 
- 17 -
Holt waived her rights to strictly enforce the contract, 
including the closing date and the manner in which the $500 
earnest money would be paid. Consideration was not lacking and 
did not fail. There is no statute of frauds problem, since the 
only person with an interest to convey (Holt) signed, and since 
part performance makes the statute inapplicable. 
Krantz requests that the Court reverse and remand this 
case, with instructions to hear the case on the merits or to 
grant summary judgment in favor of Krantz. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 1990. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorneys for Apellant Krantz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ th day of October, 1990, I 
caused an original and nine copies of the foregoing brief to be 
filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court and caused four copies 
to be served, by postage prepaid mail or hand delivery on the 
same date, to: 
Wendell E. Bennett, Esq. 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mitchell R. Barker 
- 18 -
